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Merleau-Ponty and the Measuring Body 
 
Aud Sissel Hoel and Annamaria Carusi1 
 
Introduction 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty is known as the philosopher of the body and embodiment, and almost 
any study, analysis or theory dealing with these topics has traces of his influence. His radical 
reframing of embodiment has been deeply formative of contemporary philosophical and critical 
thought about perception and cognition, which challenges Cartesian and neo-Cartesian notions of 
vision and mind (e.g. Varela et al., 1991; No, 2004; Gallagher, 2005). Merleau-Ponty is not, 
however, a philosopher who is spontaneously thought of in the context of science and technology 
studies. He is largely absent from efforts by a growing number of scholars in science studies and 
related fields to develop new approaches to ontology that, to an increasing extent, account for 
both knowledge and being in terms invoking process, networked agency, and performativity (e.g. 
Stengers, 2000; Mol, 2002; Latour, 2005; Barad, 2007; Coole and Frost, 2010; Dolphijn and van 
der Tuin, 2012; Braidotti, 2013). These efforts often go together with a renewed interest in the 
instrumentation of science and the roles played by symbolisms and tools, which are no longer 
thought of as external to being but as integral to processes of becoming (Simondon, 1958; 
Stiegler, 1994, 1996, 2001). This article aims to bring Merleau-Ponty into these conversations. 
We focus in particular on his later work, and on his reframing of the body through the notion of 
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flesh. Readers will discover resonances with current attempts to displace entrenched dualisms 
and offer alternative ontologies, as well as with present-day efforts to theorise the co-functioning 
of embodiment and technicity2. First, we re-affirm Merleau-PontyÕs position as a precursor of 
todayÕs innovative recastings of technoscience. Second, we show that arriving at a non-dualist 
ontology from the direction of his phenomenological grounding makes a difference and brings a 
distinctive contribution. We formulate this through a new conceptual tool, the Ômeasuring bodyÕ, 
which brings bodies, symbolic systems and technologies into a new constellation that 
reconfigures agency and materiality.  
Choosing to focus on Merleau-Ponty for a re-thinking of technologies may appear to be 
an odd choice since Merleau-PontyÕs references to technologies are often asides to the main 
thrust of his thought on embodied perception, and though illuminating, these references are few, 
especially in his major works. While Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy has had a huge resurgence 
since the body and embodiment in all its forms have come to take centre stage in studies of 
perception and experience across disciplines such as cultural and gender studies, anthropology, 
science studies, cognitive science, and aesthetics, he has been criticised for his failure adequately 
to account for technology3. We believe, instead, that there is an unrealised potential in the Ïuvre 
of Merleau-Ponty to give a novel account of the roles of technologies in science, including their 
ontological import. This potential arises, however, not so much from Merleau-PontyÕs explicit 
remarks on technology as from his thoroughgoing re-thinking of the relationship between the 
sensible and the intelligible, which, as pointed out by Mauro Carbone, is necessary for a 
philosophical reformulation of ontology in dynamic terms (Carbone, 2004: xiv). Much recent 
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scholarship focuses precisely on the ontological implications of Merleau-PontyÕs reconfiguring 
of the perceiving body (e.g. Barbaras, 2004 [1991]; Carbone, 2004; Toadvine, 2009; Bannon, 
2011), and by extension, on the implications for understanding language, mediated artefacts, and 
the normative dimension of human engagements and entanglements with the world (e.g. Abram, 
1997; Dastur, 2004; Baerveldt and Voestermans, 2005; Gnzel, 2007). The relevance of 
Merleau-PontyÕs thinking has also been affirmed by scholars working on digital technologies and 
new media art, notably by Mark B. N. Hansen (2006, 2014)4. We agree with Hansen that 
ÔMerleau-PontyÕs final ontology of the flesh, with its postulation of a fundamental indifference 
between body and world, requires a technics -- a theory of the originary technicity of the humanÕ 
(Hansen 2006: ix). However, whereas Hansen claims that the technical dimension of 
embodiment is missing in Merleau-PontyÕs work and seeks to catalyse this dimension by 
engaging with digital media art and other philosophers, we aim to show that there are also 
resources to conceptualise this dimension in Merleau-PontyÕs own work.5  
This article contributes to the ongoing work of reformulating ontology and understanding 
the technical dimension of embodiment by developing an approach that reconsiders some of 
Merleau-PontyÕs key ideas regarding the expressive and revealing capacities of the perceiving 
body, with particular emphasis on the formative and transformative capacities of tools, symbolic 
systems, and other cultural forms of expression6. While his own distinction between the body 
and technologies at some points led to an impasse and a failure fully to realise the potential of his 
own resources, we exploit these resources by going further in the direction sketched out in 
extremely suggestive and thought-provoking texts, notes and passages found in his later work, 
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taking Merleau-Ponty beyond himself. Our intervention focuses on a cluster of ideas revolving 
around the body as a standard or measure of things, which in The Visible and the Invisible (1968 
[1964]) and Nature (2003 [1995])7 were worked out within the framework of Merleau-PontyÕs 
expansive notion of flesh (to be explained below). Taking our inspiration from some key quotes 
in these and other works, we develop a conceptual tool that we will refer to as the Ômeasuring 
bodyÕ8. In this context, ÔmeasuringÕ and related terms such as ÔmeasureÕ and ÔmeasurementÕ are 
conceived more broadly than their strictly quantitative meaning. Indeed, in the quotes that 
inspired this article, Merleau-Ponty treats ÔmeasurementÕ as an ontological concept that concerns 
the inner scaffolding of the existential field, the Ôinvisible armatureÕ of the perceived (Merleau-
Ponty, 2003: 224). These passages all emphasize the complicity and reversibility between 
measuring agencies and measured phenomena9. As a Ômeasure of beingÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 
124), the perceiving body is seen as mutually intertwined or entangled with the phenomena it 
targets, bodies and environments co-shaping each other in ongoing processes of differentiation. 
While Merleau-Ponty did not himself use the term Ômeasuring bodyÕ in this exact wording, we 
hope to show that the possibility of this further development offers itself at many points in his 
published and unpublished works. The advantage of this new conceptual tool is that it neither 
privileges nor coincides with sensory perception. It acknowledges that technoscientific 
interrogations of the world involve distributed and displaced agencies of observation that engage 
in a two-way formative exchange between observer and observed -- challenging pre-conceived 
dualisms between bodies and environments, humans and nonhumans. 
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 The originality of Merleau-PontyÕs work lies in the way that epistemological questions, 
and in his later thinking, ontological questions, converge on the perceiving body. In recent years, 
there has been a keen interest in Merleau-Ponty, since it is to his Phenomenology of Perception 
(1962 [1945]) that we owe the first systematic treatment of the perceiving body invoked in a 
double critique of both ÔobjectivismÕ10 and ÔintellectualismÕ. The renewed interest in the body is 
often associated with different attempts at developing anti-essentialist or relational ontologies. 
Here too, Merleau-Ponty is a precursor, since a persistent concern in Merleau-PontyÕs 
philosophy is to develop an alternative to substantivist ontologies and representational 
epistemologies. His first attempts culminated in the Phenomenology of Perception, but no sooner 
had he completed this work, than he already saw the limitations of identifying the body with 
sensory perception, for two reasons: first, since the Phenomenology of Perception starts with the 
consciousness-object distinction, it never fully succeeds in overcoming this distinction; and 
second, since it foregrounds the descending movement into incarnated, perceptual meaning, it 
does not really succeed in accounting for the passage from perceptual to ideational meaning.11 In 
his later work, Merleau-Ponty resumes his concern with the crucial role played by the perceiving 
body and what he identifies as Ôthe most difficult pointÕ namely Ôthe bond between the flesh and 
ideaÕ (1968: 149). He now integrates his investigation of perception with an ontological 
exploration, developing his own Ôontology of the fleshÕ12. The resulting approach, which 
Merleau-Ponty did not get the chance to elaborate fully, revolves around the highly original and, 
we believe, path-breaking idea of the body as a standard of measurement. 
Forthcoming in Theory, Culture and Society 
6 
 
 Despite his reservations about his earlier approach, Merleau-Ponty did not discard 
perception as the primary mode in which the lived body relates to its surroundings. He repeatedly 
insists that the passage to the conceptual world is continuous, and that ideational meanings are 
never really uprooted from perception -- not even in their formalized versions. How is this 
possible? In his introduction to a recent edited volume on Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel de Saint 
Aubert gives us a clue: If Merleau-PontyÕs earlier approach to embodied perception is 
characterised by its descending and centripetal movement into incarnated meaning, his later 
work -- converging on the notion of flesh -- emphasizes instead an expansive and expressive 
dynamic that does not stop at sensory perception but extends into and comprises intellectual life 
(Saint Aubert, 2008: 10, 14). This is precisely the point where we make our intervention. The 
aim of this article is to explore and further elaborate upon the expansive notion of flesh, outlining 
an approach that, to an even larger extent than does the later Merleau-Ponty, emphasizes the 
mediated nature of knowledge and being, by more radically integrating mediating artefacts into 
the perceptual/conceptual complex. This implies granting a relative agency and autonomy to 
symbolisms and tools, whose ÔnonhumanÕ modes of operation13 serve to decentre and displace 
the interrogating capacities of the perceiving body in productive ways. By thus further 
accentuating the expansive dynamic of the flesh, the proposed approach reconfigures the 
perceiving body into a symbolically and technologically distributed measuring body. This 
reconfiguration calls attention to the ontological import of symbolisms and tools, which, each in 
their own way, operate as Ômeasures of beingÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1973: 124).  
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Flesh and the Body as Standard or Measure 
In his later work, Merleau-Ponty continues his critical engagement with the Cartesian legacy, 
which is now supplemented by a critical engagement with the thinking of Jean-Paul Sartre. He 
reproaches the latter for a disjunction between subjects and objects, brought about by his sharp 
distinction between the Ôin-itselfÕ and the Ôfor-itselfÕ. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty maintains, conceives 
subjectivity as holding being in front of itself as a spectacle and, hence, as not operating Ôfrom 
the middle of thingsÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 2008: 48, our translation). This contrasts with Merleau-
PontyÕs project, which explores the in-betweenness, the lived relations in which we are 
embedded. There is also a further and deeper sense in which Sartre, in Merleau-PontyÕs view, 
fails to start from the middle of things. SartreÕs conception of human beings as free remains 
bound up in the distinction between the for-itself and the in-itself. Thus, human beings can only 
be free at the cost of the lack of freedom of natural objects. Again this contrasts with Merleau-
PontyÕs approach, according to which nature offers resistance to the operation of free subjectivity 
(2008: 53). There is a depth in being that is lost in SartreÕs account, since, by conceiving the for-
itself (consciousness) as a mere negation of the in-itself, it fails to address the productive 
negativity in being and from which being is born. It is precisely this notion of a productive and 
working negativity in being14 that Merleau-Ponty is getting at when he coined the term ÔfleshÕ. 
Merleau-PontyÕs main objection to SartreÕs philosophy of subjectivity, and to the Cartesian 
tradition more generally, is that these approaches fail to ascribe an appropriate role to the 
perceiving body. What sets Merleau-PontyÕs ontological exploration apart, is that it accords the 
perceiving body a non-trivial ontological role, invoking a notion of corporality that is not the 
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object-body but flesh in its formative role as productive negativity. It is important to note that, in 
contrast to philosophies of subjectivity, flesh is not conceived as the formative activity of a 
masterly subject but as a site of reciprocity and mutual responsiveness where perceivers and 
environments shape and co-constitute each other. Flesh, therefore, as Merleau-Ponty conceives 
it, does not fit into established ontological categories. It is not substance or matter in the sense of 
the hard in-itself, but nor is it spirit or consciousness. Flesh does not rest comfortably on any side 
of traditional ontological divides; it is, rather, Ôthe formative medium of the object and the 
subjectÕ (1968: 147).  
An idea that has received less attention in commentaries on Merleau-PontyÕs notion of 
the flesh is that of the body as a standard or measure15. The terms ÔmeasureÕ and ÔmeasurementÕ 
recur at several points in Merleau-PontyÕs writing, but their meanings and connotations change 
from one text to another. In Phenomenology of Perception (1962: 122), in the context of a 
discussion of the way that the lived body inhabits time and space, he states that Ô[a]t every 
moment, previous attitudes and movements provide an ever ready standard of measurementÕ 
(1962: 122). This already points towards the ÔmeasuringÕ role of the body, which is accentuated 
in his later discussions of flesh. In ÔIndirect Language and the Voices of SilenceÕ (1993b: 86), he 
mentions the way in which perspectival painting uses a Ôstandard of measurementÕ of the sizes of 
things. In ÔEye and MindÕ (1993c: 133Ð134) this form of measurement, which is normally 
associated with Cartesian or ÔprosaicÕ vision where objects are seen as external to vision and as 
extended before it, is re-thought as issuing from ÔpoeticÕ vision where seer and seen are 
understood to labour in complicity16. The shift is definitive in The Visible and the Invisible, and 
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at several points in Nature, where vision no longer merely uses a standard of measurement; 
rather the seeing body is itself a standard of measurement. In the working notes to The Visible 
and the Invisible, for example, Merleau-Ponty writes: Ômy body is not only one perceived among 
others, it is the measurant (mesurant) of all, Nullpunkt of all the dimensions of the worldÕ (1968: 
248Ð249). The first four of the eight sketches published in Nature (2003)17, work and re-work 
the idea of the body as measure, or standard of measurement, as Merleau-Ponty experiments with 
different ways of trying out this idea. For example, in the second sketch he writes:  
 
This means that instead of a science of the world by relations contemplated from the 
outside (relations of space, for example), the body is the measurement of the world. I am 
open to the world because I am within my body. But how do I have a sort of commonality 
with this mass of matter? -- Precisely because it is not a mass of matter, it is rather a 
standard of things. (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 217)18.  
 
It is the latter idea of the body as a Ôstandard of thingsÕ that we develop further under the name of 
the Ômeasuring bodyÕ. 
While Merleau-Ponty himself did not coin the term Ômeasuring bodyÕ, our use of the term 
is intended as one way in which the trajectory of the notions of measure and measurement can be 
further developed. In its role as a Ômeasurant of the thingsÕ, as Merleau-Ponty points out in The 
Visible and the Invisible, the body is neither a thing nor an idea. (1968: 152) The reason why the 
notion of the measuring body does not fit established ontological categories, is that it forces us to 
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recognize something that is unheard of in the dualist scheme of things, namely, Ôan ideality that 
is not alien to the fleshÕ -- an ideality, that is, which gives flesh Ôits axes, its depth, its 
dimensionsÕ (1968: 152). Likewise, it forces us to recognize a Ôlogos of perceptionÕ, or, as he 
also puts it, a Ônatural symbolismÕ of the body, which is tacit but fully operative in living beings 
of all kinds19. This, then, is why the measuring body is a promising starting point for addressing 
the difficult question about how to overcome the divide between the intelligible and the sensible 
worlds.  
 
Key Concepts for a Dynamic Reformulation of Ontology 
The idea of the body as a standard or measure forms part of Merleau-PontyÕs broader ontological 
project. In this section we discuss some of the key concepts in Merleau-PontyÕs endeavour to 
ontologically reframe perception, which at the same time allow us to further develop the notion 
of the measuring body. All of these concepts emphasize the mutual intertwining and 
entanglement of the seen and the seeing, of the measured and the standard of measurement, each 
concept adding another nuance to the articulation of a carnal, integrated and dynamic ontology.  
 
Environment (Umwelt) 
A central concern of Merleau-PontyÕs philosophy of the flesh is the attempt to develop an 
alternative to substantivist ontologies and mechanistic ways of thinking about causation.  In this, 
he found support in the biological theory of his time, where he took a particular interest in those 
biologists who offered alternatives to mechanistic causal accounts of animal behaviour, such as 
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Jakob von Uexkll, Edward S. Russell, Adolf Portmann, and Konrad Lorenz, whom Merleau-
Ponty discusses in depth in the series of lectures dedicated to the Ômodern biologyÕ20. This new 
form of biology tended to give prominence to the complex feedback systems among organs and 
physiological processes in an organism, and among organisms and environments. The turn to the 
insights of the thinkers at the forefront of Ômodern biologyÕ coincided with Merleau-PontyÕs 
grappling with the relation between measurement and the body. Jakob von UexkllÕs notion of 
ÔenvironmentÕ (Umwelt) is especially significant, delineating as it does an in-between world21. 
Uexkll accounted for biological processes in terms of meaningful behaviour, and therefore as 
always oriented towards something in a targeted way, rather than mechanistically caused. 
Depending on their structure, different kinds of organisms address different aspects of the 
physical world, which means that even if they live in the same physical locality, they live in 
different ÔenvironmentsÕ in UexkllÕs specific meaning of the term. For Uexkll, the 
environment of an organism is constituted through the range of possible interactions between 
organism and the physical world. However, in contrast to Ôlower animalsÕ, which, according to 
Uexkll, are not reliant, for their behaviour, on feedback from the physical world (one example 
given is the amoeba), Ôhigher animalsÕ are characterized by the way that they respond to stimuli 
with fine-grained actions that are not determined in advance, neither by the structure of the 
organism nor by the structure of the physical world22. For these animals, the environment is an 
opening onto an existential field of possible perceptions and actions, which is to say that the 
organism relates to the world as a transformer rather than as a mere receptor. For Merleau-Ponty, 
the philosophical attraction of UexkllÕs notion of environment is that it is Ôdestined to join what 
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we usually separateÕ (2003: 173). Merleau-Ponty sees himself as continuing the project of the 
biological theories by which he was inspired, in his reconfiguring of the body and its relation to 
its environment through an ontology of the flesh conceived as a deep critique of mechanistic 
causal thinking. This brings us to the next concept. 
 
Circuit  
Georges Canguilhem, one of the proponents of the new biology to whom Merleau-Ponty 
frequently refers, outlines the main characteristics of the new approach to interactions between 
organisms and their environment in this way: The relationship between the organism and the 
environment is the same as the part-whole relationship within the parts of the organism and the 
whole organism. This results in a different ontological parsing of organism and environment, in 
that the organism does not abruptly end at the outside layer of its skin, but extends into its 
environment as much as the environment extends into it. In addition, there is a functional 
interchangeability between the variables in the relationship. ÔTo liveÕ, therefore, Ôis to spread out; 
it is to organize a milieu starting from a central reference point that cannot itself be referred to 
without losing its original meaningÕ (Canguilhem, 2001: 21). This way of thinking about 
biological relationships is better expressed by means of metaphors of spheres, circles, or centred 
formations, which, as Canguilhem notes, rejects the thinking of environment in mechanistic or 
quantitative terms (2001: 11). This same metaphor of the circle or circuit is often used by 
Merleau-Ponty for describing the relationships of perception and lived experience throughout his 
work23. The idea of the circuit that emerges from the work of biologists such as Uexkll 
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destabilises the ontology that sustains mechanistic thinking, because the complex dialogical 
patterns of actions and reactions that they describe are not in a simple relation of causality. 
Instead of causal relations, it opens the possibility of thinking in terms of behaviour and 
meaning, that is, in terms of organisms that are oriented toward and act upon their environments 
which in turn respond and shape the organism. The circuit is a space of mutual and co-
constitutive interactions -- or better perhaps, an evolving space of Ôintra-actionsÕ24-- which may 
well be triggered by something in the physical world, but this triggering would count for nothing 
if it were not already anticipated by an orientation of the organism which must first of all be 
equipped to notice it, and importantly, have an interest in it, for example, as something that 
might be ingested. The interactions between organisms and environments, therefore, are targeted 
interactions, and this is how meaning comes into the picture. Thus understood, the existence of 
an organism is not Ôa punctual correspondence between the present milieu and the action of the 
organismÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 192). If behaviour is understood from moment to moment, we 
lose track of its meaning. That a behaviour is ÔmeaningfulÕ means that it forms part of a larger 
whole:  
 
Each part of the situation acts only as part of a whole situation; no element of action has a 
separate utility in fact. Between the situation and the movement of the animal, there is a 
relation of meaning which is what the expression Umwelt conveys. The Umwelt is the 
world implied by the movement of the animal, and that regulates the animalÕs movements 
by its own structure. (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 175)  
Forthcoming in Theory, Culture and Society 
14 
 
 
As is clearly seen in this quotation, meaningful behaviour implies a capacity for movement on the 
part of the organism or animal, as it is in movement that the targeting of the environment by the 
organism is manifested. Merleau-Ponty takes this further and makes movement an indispensable 
ingredient in his new ontology by conceiving it as a prerequisite for the perceiving bodyÕs 
expressive and revealing capacity.  
 
Movement and Body Schema 
According to Uexkll, the movement of the organism as it interacts with its environment is 
crucial to the development of physiological features of the organism, such as its musculo-skeletal 
structure and its nervous system25. Merleau-Ponty would have found an echo of his own re-
appraisal of movement as an indispensable element of sensibility and perception. From the time 
of his 1953 lectures, he was working on a conception of movement that would overcome two 
prevailing opposing conceptions: the ÔobjectiveÕ notion of movement as conceived from the 
outside, as if it takes place in a space in a punctuated series, and the contrasting ÔsubjectiveÕ 
notion, which identifies movement with an immanent duration of consciousness26. Merleau-
Ponty seeks to overcome this false opposition between the subjective and the objective poles, by 
outlining an account that starts off from their mixing (mlange), which occurs in moving oneÕs 
own body. Taking movement and action as the starting point, notions such as interior and 
exterior, before and after, here and there (Merleau-Ponty, 2011: 92), are not merely juxtaposed 
but integrated in a dynamic way. Put simply, the sphere of possible movements is formed 
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through both the bodyÕs plans and projects, and the possibilities offered by the existential field, 
acting indissolubly together. In Merleau-PontyÕs thinking this gives rise to an incarnated notion 
of movement which stresses the way that the movement of the body is already pre-figured in the 
bodyÕs projects and plans (motifs) projected onto the existential field but also figured in response 
to that existential field. Hence, the existential field is a Ôcharged fieldÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 
264). Thus understood, the notion of movement ties directly into Merleau-PontyÕs notion of 
Ôbody schemaÕ27, which precisely highlights the bodyÕs function as a dynamic integrator. In 
analogy with the nervous system of the animal as conceived by Uexkll, the body schema is 
formed in the circuit between the living being and its environment, as it moves and interacts with 
things in the physical world. For Merleau-Ponty, the body schema is a Ôsystem of referencesÕ in 
terms of which action in an environment is ÔplannedÕ (at a pre-reflexive level), and also a 
relationship to external space which results in the body and the space in which it is set being one 
system (Merleau-Ponty, 2011: 129). This is another instantiation of the body extending into the 
world and vice versa, forming a circuit; the body schema is not simply of the body. In this circuit 
between body and environment, the body schema is that through which there is symbolism and 
expression28 already in the sensible world; and movement is that through which the circuit is 
engendered. But as the circuit is engendered, so too is an environment with particular 
dimensions. We turn to this next.  
 
Dimensions  
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In UexkllÕs conception of the mutual interactions between organisms and environments, not all 
organisms have the same environment. There is not one environment for all, but specific lived 
environments with dimensions apt for the needs and sensorimotor equipment of the organism in 
question. Merleau-Ponty uses the notion of dimension throughout his work. In Phenomenology 
of Perception it is associated with perception and expression, as well as with space and time, 
whereas in ÔCzanneÕs DoubtÕ (1993a) and ÔIndirect Language and the Voices of SilenceÕ 
(1993b) it is used in the context of the treatment of depth in perspectival painting. Later 
treatments of the term, however, specifically resist treating dimensions as an accumulation of 
layers (from 1D through 3D and, adding time, 4D), and instead re-think dimension as closely 
related to the notions of productive negativity and reversibility. For example, in ÔEye and MindÕ 
(1993c), he writes that depth is not a Ôthird dimensionÕ, as though it could be stripped away 
leaving any form of meaningful experience. Instead, depth is beyond any particular dimension, 
being rather Ôthe experience of the reversibility of dimensions, a global localityÕ (1993c: 140). 
By Ôreversibility of dimensionsÕ he means that any particular access or point of opening onto 
space can be displaced and can itself become that which is opened upon. In his late work, this 
dynamic of reversibility is what characterizes incarnated existence as a general mode of being 
(1968: 147), which is neither substance nor consciousness. The familiar example of reversibility 
given by Merleau-Ponty is that of the two hands touching each other, and the exchange between 
them as they alternate between touching and touched. Flesh is that which allows for the 
reversibility of one hand to touch in one moment and to be touched in the next. The experience 
as toucher is defined not as a positivity, but rather in terms of a productive negativity of that 
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which is not now realised but will or can be. It is in this sphere of possible or imminent reversals 
that lived experience with its qualities and characteristics is played out. This means that the 
dimensionality of the lived world is produced by a Ôpattern of negations, a system of oppositions 
that means that what is not this, is that, field, dimensionÕ (2003: 238).  
The reversibility of toucher and touched is possible because there is a gap between them 
(the experiences of touching and of being touched do not completely coincide), a gap which is 
both temporal and spatial, which holds them apart as experiences, but which also allows for a 
differentiation between them. This means that touching and touched are not defined as 
experiences in and of themselves, but only in their divergence from each other. The 
differentiation therefore is not arbitrary, but conditioned by that from which it differs: it is a 
divergence or a splitting off from what is already there. Merleau-Ponty refers to this process as 
ÔcartÕ29. Merleau-Ponty also conceives of this divergence in terms of a dynamic figure-ground 
relationship. The gradual taking-shape of a figure against a background is for Merleau-Ponty a 
basic meaningful structure whose dynamic is repeated at all levels. This is why, in The Visible 
and the Invisible, he refers to the figure-ground dynamic as a Ôkey to the problem of the mindÕ 
(1968: 192). However, in its ongoing process of divergence and differentiation the body does not 
open onto everything. It is a Ôspecified openingÕ (2003: 238)30 that engenders specific 
dimensions of a lived environment with a particular range of possibilities of actions, interactions 
and perceptions. Living being, in other words, never moves in an abstract universal space but in 
a lived, concretised and dimensioned world. It always moves in the middle of things, rooted in 
the presently available reversibilities of flesh. Further, even if it is ÔspecifiedÕ, the opening is 
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never fixed but variable. The body schema has the capacity to be modified or transformed, for 
instance, by training and learning new skills, and even more so when symbolisms and tools (each 
with their own ÔnonhumanÕ mode of operation) are introduced into the circuit -- hence the 
insistence on the expansive dynamic of flesh.  
 
Interworld 
UexkllÕs notion of environment implies that lived worlds are plural. However, it does not 
imply, that these worlds are private, solipsistic spaces. The body schema is not just a relation to 
space and to things, but essentially, a relation to other body schemas too, making every ÔworldÕ 
always already an ÔinterworldÕ shared with others (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 48, 62, 84, 26931, 2003: 
210, 214). Body schemas open onto each other and are interlaced into each other: it is not just 
that we are aware of others but that the interlaced body schema articulates shared modes of lived 
being, among which there is neither complete alterity nor complete coincidence. Continuing with 
the example of the two hands: each hand does what the other does in turn, not independently but 
based on a mutual recognition of a behaviour that each can take on or adopt, reciprocally. The 
experience of recognition is possible because of a commonality of the touched with the body 
schema of toucher; they are, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, Ômade of the same stuffÕ (2003: 224). The 
dynamic reversibility exemplified by the two hands also extends into the interworld: far from 
being exterior, accidental others, other body schemas are essential in forming the nature of 
experience of each living being. There is a mutual recognition in and across body schemas, 
which means the behaviour of living beings is meaningful also in the sense of being recognisable 
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by others. The movements of individual beings are inscribed into a visible structure that is seen 
by others as expressive, that is, something that is recognised as a behaviour that others can take 
up and adopt. This means that that there is a collective aspect to behaviour; as soon as something 
is taken as expressive there is a carnal communicability to it, and with that an Ôopening to 
generalityÕ32: There is an identification and co-perception between body schemas; living beings 
live the behaviours offered by others as their own; they perceive other living beings as 
perceiving the same sensibles that they could themselves perceive (2003: 225). 
Productive negativity, reversibility and the cart, and the interlacing of body schemas are 
all ways through which the dimensions of the lived interworld are engendered, which make it 
livable as having specific possibilities of spatiality and temporality, with specific possibilities of 
behaviours and comportments. It is against the background of these concepts that the notion of 
the measuring body must be placed. The measuring body is the instantiation of flesh as formative 
medium for which and through which there is a lived interworld with specific dimensions; it is 
the being that enters into a circuit with the environment and fellow beings, as a body schema 
intertwining and overlapping with other body schemas, as a dynamic reversibility instituting 
specific dimensions and styles of behaviour recognisable by others.  
As we have seen, embodied being is expressive in the sense that there is a carnal 
communicability to its behaviours. However, it is also expressive in another sense, relating to an 
inventive aspect at the heart of the bodyÕs functioning -- the capacity to institute new 
phenomena, to open new dimensions and hence to displace the horizons of the established. 
Productive negativity is the inventive principle at work in this ongoing dynamic process of 
Forthcoming in Theory, Culture and Society 
20 
 
opening new dimensions of being, while by the same token, it closes others. In this way, 
Merleau-PontyÕs later thinking significantly deepens the analysis of embodied perception by 
foregrounding an expansive dynamic that, rather than accounting for the body as the basis of 
perception and meaning, explores the ways in which bodily perception, in its interactions with 
the lived world is already a kind of language, and already presupposes the work of an expressive 
function (2011: 45). It makes room, in other words, for a symbolism33 that is already at work in 
the sensible world, and whose differentiating figure-ground dynamic is repeated at other levels.  
 
Symbolisms and Tools as Measures of Being 
In this section we draw together the different concepts that delineate Merleau-PontyÕs 
ontological project, which emphasises the expansive dynamic of flesh. We carry this expansion 
further by recasting symbolisms and tools as measuring agencies in their own right (ÔmeasuringÕ 
here taken in Merleau-PontyÕs ontological meaning), which, when injected into perceptual 
circuits, take on ontological import. 
 Merleau-PontyÕs suggestion that there is a symbolism of the sensible world is radical, 
since it implies that there is a Ôuniversality of sensationÕ (2003: 78)34. However, as it is used here, 
ÔuniversalityÕ takes on a new meaning that is captured with Merleau-PontyÕs notion of ÔstyleÕ of 
being. As soon as there is a style of being, there is a way of doing or being, among other ways. 
Styles can be particular and individual; but they also have generality in the sense of regularities 
or patterns that can be recognised by others, and even taken up by others, and Ômade their ownÕ. 
There is also generality in the sense that styles of being anticipate possible situations, something 
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that further underscores that there is no point-to-point correspondence between the organism and 
what is perceptually available here and now. Returning to the biological inspiration for Merleau-
PontyÕs thinking, in their dialogical encounters with the environment organisms manifest styles 
of behaviour, even in their instinctual behaviours. This is evident in cases where animals mime 
their own behaviours in an exaggerated way, as when a duck uses the movements involved in 
taking off in flight as a sign for training the young, or in behaviours that involve ritualisation, as 
in battles of wolves (2003: 195Ð196). Merleau-Ponty uses these examples to show that, through 
the generality of style, there is a symbolic aspect to the behaviour of animals (2003: 198). The 
suggestion that there is a symbolism of the sensible world is radical also because it implies that 
there is ÔinventionÕ on the side of nature. This is already implicated in living beingsÕ capability of 
anticipating possible situations, since anticipation involves a way of actively targeting the 
environment. At the same time, the affordances (Gibson, 1979) of the environment shape the 
targeting activity. In the circuit of this to-and-fro between targeting and targeted, living beings 
and environments are co-created, forming ÔdimensionsÕ or ÔworldsÕ that exhibit particular styles 
or patterns, and, in so doing, enact a specific Ôtype of organizingÕ (2011: 54) that Merleau-Ponty 
refers to as the Ôlogos of perceptionÕ, and sometimes also as the Ôwild principle of LogosÕ (2011: 
54, 1968: 211).  
In the preparatory notes for his courses on the sensible world and the expressive world, 
Merleau-Ponty formulates a new ÔprogramÕ for integrating the notion of expression35 into his 
notion of perception. Through this new and deeper analysis of perception, he hopes to achieve 
two things: first, to Ôdevelop a concrete theory of the mindÕ; and second, to Ôre-establish the unity 
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and at the same time the difference between the perceived world and the intelligible worldÕ 
(2011: 45, our translation). To accommodate the expressive function, however, the notion of 
perception has to be expanded so as to comprise what it has traditionally been opposed to: 
cognition, intellect, understanding, judgement, and the like. According to Merleau-PontyÕs 
program for integrating expression and perception, everything is still perception, but no longer in 
a restricted sensory meaning (2011: 54). The ÔuniversalityÕ at work in living being is a universal 
of a new kind (not recognized by the philosophers Merleau-Ponty is criticizing), since it is 
material or carnal: ÔThe universal is not the concept but this perception in flesh and blood, 
foundation of my relation with others.Õ (2003: 78). The ÔuniversalÕ in this new meaning cannot 
be identified with the concept alone floating free of anything bodily and material. Perception 
itself is both bodily and conceptual or general, just as language is both material and signifying. 
As Merleau-Ponty writes: ÔAn organ of the moving senses (the eye, the hand) is already a 
language because it is an interrogation (movement) and a response [É], speaking and 
understandingÕ (2003: 211). In this way Merleau-PontyÕs idea of an operative and carnal 
universality, makes room for new notions of agency and materiality, which find their roots on 
neither side of the nature-culture divide but precisely at the junction or crossing-over of physis 
and logos (2003: 199).  Thus understood, the Ômost difficult pointÕ is no longer framed in terms 
of passing from one world (sensible) to the other (intelligible); rather, the intelligible world 
installs itself in the sensible world, and, by so doing, displaces its horizons. What we have to do 
with is a Ôsurpassing that does not leave its field of originÕ (1968: 153). Reciprocally this means 
that the meanings and formalisations of the intelligible world also need to be understood 
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differently: Ôpure ideality is itself not without flesh nor freed from horizon structuresÕ (1968: 
153). 
 In his attempt to develop an ontology that foregrounds the expansive and expressive 
dynamic of flesh, Merleau-Ponty is acutely aware of the need to take account of tools as well as 
other artefacts, primarily works of art. In Le monde sensible et le monde de lÕexpression, for 
example, where he sets himself the task of integrating perception and culture, he considers tools 
and artefacts not just as the expressions of humans, but as something that expresses objects or the 
world (2011: 48, 54). He also points to the transformative effect of tools and works of art (2011: 
53). In his later thinking, it is clearly works of art that preoccupy him, and explicit references to 
technologies are scarce. Critics of Merleau-Ponty, who point to a lack of attention to 
technology36 tend to overlook the extent to which works of art, symbolisms and tool are all in the 
same category for him. For example, in Le monde sensible et le monde de lÕexpression, he 
standardly refers to tools and works of art in the same sentences (2011: 48, 53, 54, etc.), and in 
ÔEye and MindÕ -- which is his most developed account of art -- he again refers to Ôtechnical 
objects, such as tools and signsÕ in the same breath as he discusses the role of mirrors in painting 
(1993c: 129). In ÔEye and MindÕ he goes far in acknowledging the ontologically transformative 
roles of symbolisms and tools, by stating that Ô[e]very technique is a Òtechnique of the bodyÓ, by 
illustrating and amplifying the metaphysical structure of our fleshÕ (1993c: 129).  
 In this and similar passages, tools, works of art, and other symbolic forms of expression 
are understood as instances of flesh that play a formative role as productive negativity. In ÔEye 
and MindÕ for example, while discussing the cave paintings of Lascaux, he maintains that images 
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are not something that one looks at Ôas one looks at a thing, fixing it in its placeÕ; rather than 
seeing it, one sees Ôaccording to, or with itÕ (1993c: 126). There is, in other words a ÔlogosÕ of 
painting, an operative and carnal universality, which Merleau-Ponty, in his essays on painting 
(1993a, 1993b, 1993c), takes to be illustrative and exemplary of the operative logos of vision as 
such. Painting, then, is one way of Ôamplifying the metaphysical structure of our fleshÕ; and 
hence, one way of ÔsurpassingÕ the sensible word without leaving its Ôfield of originÕ. But in what 
sense are symbolisms and tools, exemplified here by painting, ÔmeasuresÕ of being, and in what 
sense do their expressive dynamic amount to a kind of ÔmeasurementÕ? 
 As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, Merleau-PontyÕs use of the term Ôto 
measureÕ is broader than the ordinary sense of determining the extent, dimensions, or quantity of 
something by comparison with a standard. Merleau-PontyÕs use of the term differs from this in 
two important respects: First, it differs by emphasising the reversibility between the measured 
phenomena and the standard of measurement. This means that the measured does not precede the 
measure but nor is it a spontaneous projection of the measuring apparatus -- it is neither simply 
recorded nor merely fabricated. The measured and the measuring are co-instituted in the to-ing 
and fro-ing characteristic of the circuit, according to a specific Ôtype of organizingÕ (2011:54). 
Second, it differs by maintaining that the body is a standard of measurement. However -- and this 
is how the proposed approach reconfigures the perceiving body into a symbolically and 
technologically distributed measuring body -- there is no single all-purpose standard of 
measurement. The standard differs according to which symbolisms and tools are injected into the 
circuit. This, then, is how symbolisms and tools are granted a relative agency and can be 
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considered measuring agencies in their own right: When they are caught up in the circuit, they 
take on the role as Ômeasures of beingÕ, displacing the horizons of sensory perception and giving 
rise to new kinds of meanings and entities that, even if calibrated to bodily sensory registers, can 
never be reduced to these.  
As we have seen, the notion of the measuring body implies that the interaction of 
organisms and their environments gives rise to specific dimensions. A point that Merleau-Ponty 
does not fully develop, however, is that once the ontological force of symbolisms and tools is 
fully acknowledged, the environments opened are not one-dimensional but ÔmultidimensionalÕ -- 
in the sense that, depending on symbolism and tool in question, they are specified in multiple 
different ways. For each modification new dimensions of the world open up, new ranges of 
possible modes of measuring and being measured. This in turn creates new modes of living the 
dimensions of the world, of acting and interacting. However, in line with the general 
interrogating capacity of the flesh, which operates according to a principle of negativity (that is, 
an integrating and differentiating figure-ground dynamic), each ÔgainÕ in measuring (perceiving, 
conceiving, interacting) comes at the price of introducing new blind zones. This should come as 
no surprise, though, since for a Ôconcrete theory of the mindÕ there is no such thing as total 
access to pre-given and self-subsisting realities. There is always a style or mode according to 
which phenomena make themselves manifest.   
 
The Measuring Body: Measurement as an Engaged Operation 
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We started this article by pointing to the need for new philosophical accounts of the role of 
symbolisms and tools in knowledge and being, and in order to achieve this, we have introduced 
and developed the notion of the measuring body. The promise of this approach is that it makes us 
realise that perception and mediation are not apart from ontology, and further, that the sensible 
and the intelligible are not stacked one above the other, and do not follow one after the other. 
Rather, they are always intertwined. The key contribution of the later Merleau-Ponty is to 
reframe perception in ontological terms through the notion of flesh as a Ômetaphysical structure.Õ 
In this reframing there is a convergence of the epistemological and the ontological, and 
perception is reconfigured as an apparatus for interrogating, explicating and revealing 
phenomena. The later Merleau-Ponty opens a new trajectory for understanding agency and 
materiality by positing the perceiving body as a measure or standard of things, and this is the 
point that we develop further with the notion of the Ômeasuring bodyÕ. For Merleau-Ponty, the 
perceiving body is like a central point of reference, or what he also refers to as the ÔNullpunkt of 
all the dimensions of the worldÕ. As we have already noted, this is not a static point of reference, 
since the body schema continues to be modified and transformed. As we have also noted, the 
body schema institutes a type or style of organisation37.  
The measuring body further develops these ideas in a direction that accentuates the 
decentring of the perceiving body as well as the relative autonomy of symbolisms and tools. 
Certainly, Merleau-PontyÕs notion of body schema is already decentred, in at least three respects: 
First, in that it is not of the subject (rather, it is the formative medium of subject and object), 
second, in that it is not of the body (it extends into the environment as much as the environment 
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extends into it), and third, in that it has the capacity to alter its own borders, by acquiring new 
habits and by incorporating symbolisms and tools. However, despite the increasing focus on the 
expansion of the flesh, Merleau-PontyÕs account retains a centrality for the perceiving body. In 
our proposal of the measuring body as a conceptual tool, mediation is not so much about 
incorporation as it is about the way that the perceiving body participates in a distributed system 
that goes beyond the perceiving body, and that it cannot fully control. So, while Merleau-Ponty, 
in defining the perceiving body as a central reference point, ascribed this role to ÔmyÕ body (Ômy 
body ... is the ... NullpunktÕ), the ÔbodyÕ in the measuring body is a shared body. In addition, 
even if, as in the case of painting, Merleau-Ponty goes far in acknowledging the transformative 
roles and ontological import of mediating artefacts, he tends to focus on the continuities between 
bodily, symbolic and technological expression. Although the expressive dynamic of flesh is now 
understood to expand far beyond the sensible world, there seems to be a continued privileging of 
bodily perception as the origin of meaning -- not in the sense of source, but in the sense of 
beginning or point of departure. This, then, is where we take Merleau-Ponty beyond himself: We 
further develop his idea of the body as a ÔmeasureÕ of things by granting symbolisms and tools 
the status of ÔmeasuresÕ in their own right, that is, as ÔagenciesÕ with their own relative 
autonomy. Certainly, Merleau-Ponty is right that there is no way we can escape the carnal 
conditions of our being-in-the-world, which is why, both for him and for us, ontological 
questions inevitably converge on the perceiving body. However, Merleau-PontyÕs notion of flesh 
introduced a dissociation between the carnal and the sensible (as exemplified by the carnality of 
painting), and the measuring body pushes this dissociation further. 
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The measuring body is not an extended perceiving body. It is a distributed system where 
bodies, symbolic systems, technologies and environments are intertwined and in which 
phenomena are articulated in characteristic ways, according to particular styles. In science -- 
which like art, is an expression of lived, intellectual and cultural life -- the measuring body is an 
integrated interrogating apparatus for querying, explicating, revealing and engaging with 
phenomena (evidence, entities, objects) that are instituted with the measuring body. In such 
distributed interrogating systems, technologies play a key role, for two reasons. First, symbolic 
systems and technologies are themselves standards or measures of being, which have the 
capacity to transform the metaphysical structure of the interrogating apparatus and hence to 
displace the horizons of the perceptible/intelligible world. They open new dimensions by 
extending the scope and radius of our actions, and by giving rise to new kinds of meanings and 
entities. Second, by serving as generative mediators, symbolic systems and tools play an 
important coordinating role, and in so doing they amplify -- to an extent not fully brought out by 
Merleau-Ponty -- the collective aspect of interrogating behaviour. The multi-dimensioned worlds 
opened by measuring bodies are not only interworlds shared with others. Due to the coordinating 
roles of symbolic systems and technologies, the carnal communicability of these worlds is not 
limited to identification and co-perception between body schemas but extends to intellectual and 
cultural life. Further, it extends to the possibility of shared vision through alignment and 
repeatability.  
 The measuring body is a standard or system of standards. However this is not a 
ÔsubjectiveÕ standard, since the measuring body shapes the observers just as much as the 
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observed. Nor is it an ÔobjectiveÕ standard in the received sense of a detached Ôview from above, 
from nowhereÕ, as Donna Haraway (1988) famously puts it. Rather, the point we want to make 
here is that the dualist notions of subjectivity and objectivity fall away together with the 
possibility of seeing subjects and objects as separately and independently constituted. The upshot 
of the approach we propose is that the measuring body conditions what it means to be an 
observer or observed in that specific apparatus. On this conception, agency is shifted from the 
observer to the distributed measuring body. This is in line with recent debates concerning agency 
that have argued that agency should not be limited to human observers (Pickering 1995, Latour 
2005, Barad, 2007). However, the measuring body differs from the approaches just referred to in 
that agency is phenomenologically reframed in terms of an opening of dimensions. On the 
proposed approach, the measuring body both has agency, through its being a mode of opening, 
but also specifies agency in its particular distributed system. It is a distributed system of 
intertwined agencies of observation, which, in accordance with Merleau-PontyÕs notion of flesh, 
operates through a generative figure-ground dynamic that configures the space of observation. 
As distributed interrogating systems, measuring bodies involve displaced agencies of observation 
and measurement where the symbolic or instrumental set-ups take on the role as coordinating 
standards that amplify, guide, and align vision. 
 As a conceptual tool, the measuring body contributes to the ongoing theoretical 
articulation and empirical exploration of embodied and technologically mediated knowledge and 
being. It resonates with current postphenomenological approaches to the philosophy of 
technology, such as those of Don Ihde (2002) and Peter-Paul Verbeek (2005), who decentre 
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perception while at the same time arguing for the continued relevance of phenomenological 
frameworks38. The measuring body also resonates with the concerns of contemporary 
posthumanist approaches (Barad, 2007; Braidotti 2013), due to the way that it emphasises that no 
perceiver is at the centre of their own perception, and in this it breaks with a certain 
interpretation of phenomenology. Moreover, like the performative and multiple bodies theorised 
by many in science and technology studies, notably by Annemarie Mol (2002), the measuring 
body is multiple. Once again, though, we reframe this phenomenologically, arguing that the 
measuring body opens onto multi-dimensioned worlds.  
 The notion of the measuring body understood as a distributed system consisting of 
intertwined agencies of observation ontologically reframes scientific vision, and this has many 
further implications for our understanding of science. We conclude this article by pointing to one 
such implication, which concerns the very notion of measurement39. It may seem that what we 
have been saying about measuring has little to do with actual measuring as practiced in science, 
since in the approach presented here measuring is used in a much more general sense as the 
dimensioning of worlds, the very armature of being. However, what we argue is that measuring 
practices in scientific contexts are continuous with this sense of measuring; in fact, they are 
embedded in and made possible by it. As specific instances of measuring bodies, they enact the 
same dynamic but in highly particular ways and in more controlled settings. This also means 
that, contrary to the rhetoric of objectivity that surrounds them, there is a qualitative side to 
quantitative methods that cannot be ignored. For example, the computational approaches that are 
currently emerging in fields such as biology use a rhetoric of greater precision and predictiveness 
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in view of the quantification of biological processes, while in fact blending observational, 
mathematical, and computational practices, and thereby blurring qualitative and quantitative 
methods40. The point that scientific phenomena do not exist independently of measurement has 
been made by others: including notably Hacking (1983), Barad (2007), and Chang (2012). The 
difference in arriving at these points through grappling with Merleau-PontyÕs thinking, is first, 
the consideration of measurement and phenomena as mutually and reciprocally caught up in 
circuits of intertwinement with technologies, symbolisms and bodies, and second, the way that 
agency is framed in terms of opening of dimensions. In the proposed approach, scientific 
measurement practices enact measurement as engaged operations, that is, not as operations that 
intervene in a domain from the outside, but as operations that act from the middle of things, 
carving out the axes and dimensions of the domain under investigation. 
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1 Joint first authors.  
2 ÔTechnicityÕ understood here Ôas a relation to exteriority, as exteriorisationÕ (Hansen, 2006: viii).  
3 See for example Bruno LatourÕs comment on Merleau-Ponty and phenomenology in Ihde and Selinger (2003: 16-
17), Latour (1999: 9-10), and Ihde and Selinger (2004: 361-367). 
4 Of special interest for Hansen is Merleau-PontyÕs Ômotor intentionality for the constitution of ÒrealityÓÕ, which is 
brought to the fore by the current mixed reality paradigm with Ôunprecedented clarity and forceÕ (Hansen 2006: 7-8). 
5 These resources include notions such as: flesh, productive negativity, logos of perception, natural symbolism, 
expression, body schema, reversibility, cart, language, wild principle of logos, system of equivalences, chiasm, and 
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of particular interest here, Ômeasure of beingÕ -- many of which we discuss in this paper, or other papers (Carusi and 
Hoel, 2014a and 2014b; Hoel and Carusi, 2015).  
6 For a discussion of Merleau-PontyÕs particular use of the notion of expression, and the connections between 
Merleau-Ponty and Simondon, the thinker of technicity and individuation, see Landes (2013). 
7 Both of these were published posthumously. The Visible and the Invisible is the book that Merleau-Ponty was 
working on when he died, which consists of an incomplete manuscript followed by working notes. Nature consists 
of written traces of Merleau-PontyÕs lectures on the concepts of nature held at Collge de France in the 1950s. The 
course notes are written both by Merleau-Ponty and his students. 
8 Associating Merleau-Ponty with measurement may seem a strange move, especially when he is most closely 
identified with notions such as pre-reflective experience, motor intentionality and tacit cogito elaborated in his 
seminal work, Phenomenology of Perception. These are notions that have been, and still are, called upon in 
criticisms of the abstractions of theoretical science, including its ongoing efforts to mathematise and quantify nature. 
A famous example is Hubert DreyfusÕ critique of the rationalist vision underpinning the artificial intelligence 
research programme (Dreyfus, 1972, 1992). However, associating Merleau-Ponty with measurement should not be 
taken as a surrender to the very rationalist ideas that Merleau-Ponty has pointedly shown to have no foundation (and 
quite literally so), including the excesses of the will to quantify. Rather, the connection to measurement has to do 
with a shift in strategy in his later thinking, where, instead of seeking to recover a primordial, pre-reflexive layer in 
experience, he seeks to integrate rational processes in a new way, rethinking rationality as a formative force that 
permeates all layers of experience. Terms such as ÔmeasureÕ and ÔmeasurementÕ, then, are invoked only to be 
transformed in accordance with the expansive dynamic of flesh. 
9 This complicity, by different names, is also emphasised in contemporary approaches such as Hacking (1983), 
Barad (2007), and Chang (2012) 
10 Depending on the discipline, this thought paradigm could also be referred to as ÔnaturalismÕ, ÔbehaviourismÕ, and 
ÔmechanismÕ. 
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11 See The Visible and the Invisible (1968: 176, 200) for Merleau-PontyÕs own account of the shortcomings of 
Phenomenology of Perception. In the later work he goes so far as to advise against the use of the term ÔperceptionÕ 
at all: ÔWe exclude the term perception to the whole extent that it already implies the cutting up of what is lived into 
discontinuous acts, or a reference to ÒthingsÓ whose status is not specified, or simply an opposition between the 
visible and the invisible. Not that these distinctions are definitively meaningless, but because if we were to admit 
them from the start, we would re-enter the impasses we are trying to avoidÕ (1968: 158). 
12 For excellent introductions to Merleau-PontyÕs later thinking and the notion of flesh, see Barbaras (2004 [1991]) 
Carbone (2004) and Toadvine (2009). 
13 As in Zylinska (2016), the term ÔnonhumanÕ here refers to actants whose agency Ô[go] beyond that of human 
decision or will, even if [they] may be influenced by human actionÕ (202). In this article, the ÔnonhumanÕ aspect is 
connected with the way that symbolisms and tools are conceived as measuring agencies in their own right (see the 
section below entitled ÔSymbolisms and Tools as Measures of BeingÕ). 
14 Merleau-Ponty puts this in different ways, among which are the Ôfecund negativeÕ (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 263); 
and Ôthe negativity that worksÕ (Ôngativit qui travailleÕ) (quoted in Saint Aubert, 2008: 35). On productive 
negativity, apart from Saint AubertÕs introduction to the collection titled Maurice Merleau-Ponty (2008: 7Ð40), see 
also his introduction to Le Monde Sensible et le Monde du Silence (2011). 
15 A notable exception is Mauro Carbone, who discusses the reversibility of the notions of the measured and the 
standard of measurement in his discussion of latent intentionality (Carbone, 2004: 18Ð19). 
16 See Carusi and Hoel (2014b) for an in-depth discussion of this essay. 
17 These sketches are Merleau-PontyÕs own notes, written between 1958 and 1960, as opposed to other sections of 
Nature, which are studentsÕ notes. 
18 See for example Merleau-Ponty (2003: 211, 223, 224) for similar formulations. 
19 See also Merleau-Ponty (2011: 54, 2003: 211, 1968: 169, 211). The phrase Ôlogos of the sensible worldÕ is used at 
(2003: 166). 
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20 Among others that Merleau-Ponty associated with what he termed Ômodern biologyÕ are George E. Coghill, Kurt 
Goldstein, Arnold Gesell and Catherine Amatruda, and George Canguilhem. 
21 For accounts that deal specifically with Merleau-PontyÕs use of Uexkll, see Buchanan (2008) and Umbelino 
(2013). 
22 See Uexkll (1982) and Merleau-Ponty (2003: 167Ð73). Carusi and Hoel (2014a) discusses Merleau-PontyÕs use 
of UexkllÕs theory in the context of computational instruments used for systems biology. 
23 In fact the notion of the circuit is like a red thread to be followed from an early work such as The Structure of 
Behavior (1963 [1942]) all the way through to, for example ÔEye and MindÕ (1993c [1961]); his use of the term 
remains associated with his preoccupation with breaking with mechanistic and causal thinking from his early career. 
However, despite the apparent continuity of the term, Merleau-Ponty constantly reworks it and deploys it 
differently. 
24 To underscore the mutual constitution and entanglement of organism and environment in the circuit, we could use 
Karen BaradÕs term Ôintra-actionÕ, which she defines as follows: ÔThe neologism Òintra-actionÓ signifies the mutual 
constitution of entangled agencies. That is, in contrast to the usual ÒinteractionÓ, which assumes that there are 
separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognises that distinct agencies 
do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action.Õ Barad (2007: 33).  
25 See Uexkll (1982). There is an ongoing debate about development in biology, but we are here only referring to 
these ideas as they were influential for Merleau-PontyÕs thinking. 
26 Merleau-Ponty ascribes this latter position to Henri Bergson, see Merleau-Ponty (2011: 90-91). 
27 Merleau-Ponty introduced this notion already in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
28 And hence, in the terms of Mark Hansen, technicity or a relation to exteriority. 
29 The term ÔcartÕ has multiple meanings ranging over gap, interval, distance, difference and divergence, all of 
which Merleau-Ponty exploited. 
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30 That Merleau-Ponty is experimenting with using this term is marked by its being followed by question marks in 
his notes. 
31 In the English translation of Le Visible et lÕinvisible ÔintermondeÕ is translated as Ôintermundane spaceÕ. 
32 See also Carusi (2008) for an earlier version of the idea of communicability. 
33 Or technics (in HansenÕs terms). 
34 This breaks, for example, with the Kantian tenet of the heterogeneity of sensibility and understanding, which 
implies that there is no universality on the side of sensibility, that is, prior to the schematisation of intuitions. 
35 And hence, technics and exteriority. 
36 Apart from the much referred to cane of the blind man in Phenomenology of Perception. 
37 Elsewhere Merleau-Ponty and we call this a Ôsystem of equivalencesÕ, see for example Merleau-Ponty (1993c: 
142) and Hoel and Carusi (2015). 
38 For a discussion of Merleau-PontyÕs relevance to the philosophy of technology, and more specifically, to 
postphenomenology, see Hoel and Carusi (2015). 
39 Elsewhere, we have developed some implications of the proposed approach for understanding the visualisation 
practices of computational biologists and neuroscientists, respectively (Carusi and Hoel, 2014a, 2014b). Carusi 
(2016) mobilises the measuring body framework for rethinking the ÔrealismÕ of models in systems biology.  
40 For a detailed example of how Merleau-PontyÕs later thinking throws new light on the methods of computational 
biology, see Carusi and Hoel (2014a). 
